J AOAC Int by Beck, Linda et al.
Overview of Performance Standards for Biological Threat Agent 
Assays for Department of Defense Applications
Linda Beck,
Joint Research and Development, Inc. (JRAD), Suite 209, 50 Tech Pkwy, Stafford, VA 22556
Scott Coates,
AOAC INTERNATIONAL, 2275 Research Blvd, Suite 300, Rockville, MD 20850
Jay Gee,
CDC, MS-G34, 1600 Clifton Rd, NE, Atlanta, GA 30329
Ted Hadfield,
HADECO, LLC, 183 Ridgemont Cir SE, Palm Bay, FL 32909
Paul Jackson,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Retired), 9600 Morgan Territory Rd, Livermore, CA 
94551–9402
Paul Keim,
Northern Arizona University, Department of Biology, Center for Microbial Genetics and Genomics, 
Flagstaff, AZ 86011–4073
Luther Lindler,
DHS, 5821 Drexal Ave, New Market, MD 21774
Vicki Olson,
CDC, 1600 Clifton Rd, MS G-43, Poxvirus and Rabies Branch, Atlanta, GA 30333
Eileen Ostlund,
USDA (Retired), PO Box 844, Ames, IA 50010
Francisco Roberto,
Idaho National Laboratory, 9625 Adelaide Circle, Highlands Ranch, CO 80130
Jim Samuel,
Texas A&M, 3107 MREB, Microbial Pathogenesis and Immunology, 8447 State Hwy 47, Bryan, 
TX 77807
Shashi Sharma,
FDA-CFSAN, HFS-712, 5100 Paint Branch Pkwy, College Park, MD 20740
Sandra Tallent, and
FDA-ORS/DM, HFS-711, Room 3E-023, 5100 Paint Branch Pkwy, College Park, MD 20740
Dave Wagner
Northern Arizona University, PO Box 4073, Center for Microbial Genetics and Genomics, 
Flagstaff, AZ 86011
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
J AOAC Int. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 November 01.
Published in final edited form as:
J AOAC Int. 2018 November 01; 101(6): 1665–1708.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
History of AOAC INTERNATIONAL Involvement with Biological Threat 
Agents
There has been a proliferation in the development of biological threat agent detection 
technologies for use in the field by first responders and private-sec-tor end-users as well as 
in Department of Defense (DoD) applications in which active combat may be occurring and 
in other parts of the world. In contrast to the proliferation of detection methodology, there 
has been a lack of standards defining the required performance of these technologies. 
Standards are necessary to demonstrate the performance and limitations of the tools, 
providing confidence in the data to allow appropriate response actions by end-users and 
responders. In the past, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and 
Technology Directorate, funded AOAC to develop standards and perform conformity 
assessment under three efforts. The first effort began in 2003 to evaluate the performance of 
lateral flow immunoassay devices used by first responders to screen suspicious powders for 
Bacillus anthracis spores. These devices are colloquially known as “handheld assays” and 
are frequently referred to as “HHAs.” AOAC formed the Task Force on Bacillus anthracis 
(TFBA), which created a specific set of consensus performance criteria and test protocols 
(i.e., standards). Five HHA manufacturers submitted their technologies to AOAC so that 
third-party laboratories could evaluate the tools against the criteria (1).
Based on lessons learned from the 2003 project, DHS funded AOAC in 2006 to facilitate the 
development of a second round of consensus performance criteria for HHAs (2). AOAC 
organized a second consensus body, known as the Working Group on Standards for Hand-
Held Assays, to revisit the performance criteria developed by TFBA and to develop 
performance criteria for HHAs that screen suspicious powders for ricin. Like the first effort, 
AOAC was tasked to evaluate commercially available HHAs against the criteria; however, 
this second effort was not completed because of a reorganization of DHS at the time. In 
2007, in a third effort, DHS refocused AOAC to develop performance criteria for the 
detection of aerosolized B. anthracis, Yersinia pestis, and Francisella tularensis by PCR 
assays. AOAC formed the Stakeholder Panel on Agent Detection Assays (SPADA) to 
organize and oversee this refocused project (3).
As part of the DHS projects, AOAC developed a new standard setting process with standards 
known as Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs). Prior to the DHS project, 
AOAC’s practice in conformity assessment was always to assign a study director to collect 
validation data on a candidate method, and then assign an appropriate committee of 
volunteer experts to judge whether the data demonstrate that the candidate method is 
adequate to be approved as an AOAC Official Methods of AnalysisSM. In this model, only 
general criteria are used to determine acceptability, such as “equivalent to or better than the 
reference method.” With the DHS project, AOAC began the practice of creating 
predetermined minimum acceptance criteria for analytical performance of methods that 
detect biological threat agents. The practice has become routine and has expanded into other 
analytical method areas (4).
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Deputy Under Secretary of The Army (DUSA) Biological Threat Agent 
Method Standards Project
The DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Test & Evaluation (T&E) Executive 
established a group known as the Test and Evaluation Capabilities and Methodologies 
Integrated Process Team (TECMIPT). TECMIPT’s mission is to provide technical 
recommendations for T&E strategies, identify T&E capability gaps, and develop community 
consensus T&E standards. TECMIPT is organized by commodity areas, known as 
Commodity Area Process Action Teams (CAPATs). There are eight CAPATS: Advanced 
Threat, Chemical Detection, Biological Surveillance, Modeling and Simulation, Individual 
Protection, Collective Protection, Decontamination, and Radiological/Nuclear Defense.
The Biological Surveillance CAPAT identified a significant gap and a need to develop 
performance requirements for biological threat agent assays and, more specifically, a 
significant need to develop appropriate inclusivity and exclusivity test panels (see Biological 
Threat Agent SMPR Terms and Concepts for further explanation) for the evaluation of 
biological threat agent assays. In July 2014, SPA-DA was identified as an asset capable of 
developing performance requirements for biological threat assays. Subsequently, a project 
was initiated in November 2014 under the direction of the DUSA Test and Evaluation 
(DUSA-TE).
Initially, DUSA-TE identified three biological threat agents for SMPR development: 
Coxiella Burnetii, Staphylococcus enterotoxin B (SEB), and Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis Virus (VEEV). The following three additional threat agents were added to the 
list in early 2015: Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, and Yersina pestis. The list of 
threat agents was expanded again in 2015 to include Burkholderia pseudomallei, Variola 
virus DNA, Botulinum neurotoxins, and Brucella suis. Four of the agents identified by 
DUSA-TE (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Yersina pestis, and Burkholderia 
species) were previous subjects of AOAC SMPRs. However, of these four biological threat 
agents, only an SMPR for Bacillus anthracis was published.
A primary goal of the DUSA-TE project was to create SMPRs for the complete set of 10 
biological threat agents. Technology, especially PCR methodology, has advanced 
significantly in recent years. Method evaluators now have a broader body of knowledge to 
draw from regarding method evaluation. Therefore, DUSA-TE tasked SPADA to review the 
four previously developed SMPRs with the goal of updating them based on knowledge 
gained.
Another primary goal of the DUSA-TE project was to consider all the performance 
requirements in terms of DoD applications. Previous projects were funded by and focused 
on DHS scenarios, which included domestic (within the United States) venues such as mail 
sorting systems, mass transit sites, public spaces, sports stadiums, etc. DoD applications 
shifted the focus from domestic to international sites and added combat and hostile-site 
venues. This application necessitated adding potential combat-related interferents, such as 
explosive powders, to the environmental factors study.
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A secondary goal of the project was to reconsider whether the number of strains and species 
identified for evaluation could be streamlined based on years of experience of real-life 
evaluations carried out since 2005.
The DUSA-TE project of developing, adopting, and publishing 10 SMPRs was completed in 
October 2017. Another project reconsidered the environmental organisms specified in the 
environmental factors study, and it was added in October 2016 and completed in March 
2017.
SPADA
All biological threat agent method SMPRs are developed under the supervision of SPADA. 
SPADA is a voluntary consensus standards body of volunteers that is organized, managed, 
and administered by AOAC. It is constructed to represent the interests of various federal, 
state, and local governments, first responders, public health institutions, and industry. 
Federal agencies interested in monitoring biological threat agents include the DHS, DoD, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. SPADA’s mission is to establish method 
performance requirements through SMPRs. When active, SPADA meets two to four times 
per year to deliberate on the different methodological needs of the biological threat agent 
detection community.
To accomplish its work, SPADA is organized into a series of working groups that develop 
SMPRs and carry out other technical activities. Twelve working groups were commissioned 
for the DUSA-TE project. One working group was created for each of the 10 DUSA-TE 
identified biological threat agents, plus additional working groups were created to consider 
potential interferents and to review the environmental organisms specified in the 
environmental factors study.
Working groups performed the challenging task of translating the methodological needs of 
the biological threat agent detection community into concise SMPRs. Each working group is 
chaired by a subject matter expert and consists of 10 to 20 other subject matter experts. The 
working groups are ad hoc and adjourn sine die when their missions are completed. The 
mission of most working groups is to develop the necessary standards using the best 
available science while balancing the need to keep testing against the standards practical. 
The primary tasks of most working groups are to determine the method performance 
requirements and identify inclusivity and exclusivity species and/or strains. Ancillary 
working groups are sometimes organized to address additional issues in support of the main 
mission of developing SMPRs.
Draft SMPRs (and other recommendations) are presented to the entire assembly of SPADA 
for review during formal SPADA meetings. All SPADA members are permitted to comment 
on the draft standards and recommendations. However, a subset of 20 to 22 members are 
designated by AOAC as voting members. Voting members are carefully selected by AOAC 
to ensure a balance of stakeholder perspectives. The adoption of SMPRs and/or other actions 
requires a super-majority of greater than 66% of the designated voting members.
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Biological Threat Agent SMPR Terms and Concepts
A standard set of terms and performance parameters were developed for biological threat 
agent method SMPRs and published in 2011 (5). This standardized approach has worked 
well to maintain consistency from one SMPR to the next. These terms and parameters are as 
follows.
(a) Probability of detection (POD).—POD is the proportion of positive analytical outcomes 
for a qualitative method for a given matrix at a given agent level or concentration. POD is 
concentration-dependent (6).
(b) Acceptable minimum detection level (AMDL).—AMDL is the predetermined minimum 
level of a biological threat agent that must be detected by a candidate method with an 
estimated 5% lower confidence limit on the POD of 0.95 or higher.
(c) POD in the absence of analyte.—This is designated as POD(0) and is the rate of positive 
results in a population of known negative test portions. APOD(0) can be calculated from both 
the single-laboratory studies and the collaborative study results. APOD(0) calculated from 
pooled valid collaborative data is termed CPOD(0).
(d) Inclusivity.—Strains, isolates, or variants of the target agent(s) that the method can 
detect. Each SMPR contains a list of strains or variants called the inclusivity panel that the 
assay must be able to detect.
(e) Exclusivity.—Nontarget agents, which are potentially cross-reactive, that must not be 
detected by the method. Exclusivity is determined by testing near-neighbor species (or other 
molecules) listed in the SMPR’s exclusivity panel.
(f) Environmental interference.—The ability of the assay to detect the target agent in the 
presence of nontarget environmental organisms or substances. Environmental interference is 
evaluated using a variety of nontarget organisms and/or substances listed in an 
environmental factors panel developed for each class of assays. These may include air and 
soil background organisms, DNA viruses, microbial eukaryotes, higher eukaryotes 
(freshwater amoebae, fungi, arthropods, mammals, avian, plants), soil samples, biological 
insecticides, powders and chemicals, and swab materials. The environmental factors panel 
varies depending on the technology and intended use of the method.
SMPRs
Standard Method Performance Requirements for DNA-Based Methods of Detecting 
Bacillus anthracis in Field-Deployable, Department of Defense Aerosol Collection Devices, 
AOAC SMPR 2016.006 (7)
B. anthracis is a Gram-positive, spore-forming rod and the causative agent of anthrax. The 
CDC classifies B. anthracis as a Category A bioterrorism agent, and because of the history 
of intentional dissemination through the postal system in October 2001, this agent was given 
high priority for development of SMPRs.
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Similar projects in 2004 and 2007 preceded this project and served as a starting point for the 
DoD initiative. The 2004 project developed acceptance criteria for immunological “hand-
held assays” for detection of B. anthracis spores. A year-long discussion was required by the 
federal agencies and other SPADA members to develop consensus on the inclusivity and 
exclusivity panels for B. anthracis. The main issue was to develop an inclusivity panel that 
adequately represented the genetic diversity of B. anthracis. AOAC normally requires 50 
representatives of a species for inclusivity testing. In the case of B. anthracis, SPADA 
recognized that this species is relatively homogeneous and that 15 inclusivity strains could 
adequately represent its genetic diversity based on variable number tandem repeat analysis. 
The number of inclusivity strains was further reduced to 14 in 2016.
The original exclusivity panel developed in 2004 consisted of 20 close relatives of B. 
anthracis, including representatives of five Bacillus species. B. cereus and B. thuringiensis 
are the closest relatives and represent the largest analytical challenge. The number of 
exclusivity panel members was also reduced from 20 to 14 species in the current 2016 
SMPR.
The concept of AMDL for qualitative methods was first developed for B. anthracis PCR 
methods. The AMDL is not necessarily the lowest concentration that a method can detect, 
but it is instead a low level at which a method is required to reliably detect the analyte (in 
this case, B. anthracis). The AMDL is composed of an analyte level (mass or concentration), 
a detection requirement, and a level of confidence.
For B. anthracis detection in aerosol collection samples, SPADA set the AMDL at 20,000 
spores per filter or 2000 spores/mL buffer, balancing the practical capabilities of PCR 
methods and the needs of the testing community. SPADA also determined that the detection 
rate, known as the POD, at the AMDL should be at least 95%, but more specifically, the 5% 
lower confidence limit on the POD should be 0.95 or higher to represent the requirements of 
the testing community. This acceptance criterion can be met by testing 96 replicate test 
portions containing the analyte at the AMDL with no more than one failure. There are other 
testing schemes that can meet the POD ≥ 0.95, but a discussion of other testing schemes is 
beyond the scope of this document.
Each strain identified in the inclusivity panel is tested once at the AMDL. If the candidate 
method detects the strain, it passes the test. If the candidate method does not detect the 
inclusivity strain, then a further 96 replicates are tested, and the candidate method must 
detect all 96 replicates to meet the acceptance criterion, therefore demonstrating a POD ≥ 
0.95 at the AMDL.
Conversely, near neighbors must meet an acceptance criterion of a 95% upper confidence 
limit on the POD of 0.05 or lower. In other words, the detection rate or POD for exclusivity 
panel members should be less than 5% (detection is unwanted because these are not target 
species) with a 95% one-sided confidence limit. Exclusivity species are tested at a 
concentration of 10 times the AMDL. One replicate of each strain is tested initially. If the 
candidate method detects an exclusivity panel member, then 96 additional replicates are 
tested with no additional failures to meet the acceptance criterion.
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In addition to the inclusivity and exclusivity panels, an environmental factors study was 
developed to test for assay interference, both positive (cross-re-activity) and negative 
(inhibition of analyte detection). This environmental factors study includes both an extensive 
list of environmental organisms and a list of various potential interferents. The 
environmental organism panel contains organisms that could be encountered in aerosol 
collection samples, such as other biological threat agents, bacteria found in air and soil, 
DNA viruses, microbial eukaryotes, DNA from higher eukaryotes, and biological 
insecticides.
Standard Method Performance Requirements for DNA-Based Methods of Detecting 
Brucella suis in Field-Deployable, Department of Defense Aerosol Collection Devices, 
AOAC SMPR 2016.009 (8)
Brucella is an intracellular bacteria pathogen and the causal agent of brucellosis. Four 
species of Brucella cause the majority or brucellosis infections in humans: B. melitensis, B. 
suis, B. canis, and B. abortus. Ten currently recognized species (often with strong host-
specificity) are further divided into biovars.
The inclusivity panel includes available type strains of B. suis biovars from 1 to 4 as well as 
the genomic sequences for biovar 5 and a Chinese vaccine. The exclusivity panel includes 23 
strains and species of Brucella, including biovars of B. abortus, B. melitensis, B. canis, B. 
microti, B. neotomae, B. ovis, B. ceti, B. pinnipedialis, B. inopinata, B. papionis, B. vulpis, 
and, in addition, Agrobacteriumtumefaciens, Ochrobactrum anthropi, and Ochrobactrum 
intermedium.
The Brucella Working Group is aware that B. canis can infect humans. There are 
approximately 100 cases of human brucellosis annually. There is also a close relationship 
between B. suis and B. canis. In fact, the taxonomic classification of all Brucella spp. has 
been debated for decades, with some scientists proposing that all Brucella spp. be 
reclassified as B. melitensis based on results of DNA-DNA hybridization and that the 
current species be reclassified as biovars. However, the classic taxonomic scheme for the 
Brucella spp. and existing biovars was reapproved in 2003 based on host specificity, 
phenotypic characteristics, varying virulence, and genotyping data (9). For these reasons, 
and based on direction from DoD to focus on B. suis, the working group developed this 
SMPR specific for the detection of B. suis.
The Brucella Working Group is aware that Russian vaccines use B. abortus SR82 and B. 
abortus 7579, and possibly other strains. These vaccine strains were not available at the time 
this SMPR was adopted. Consequently, the working group decided not to include these 
vaccine strains in the exclusivity panel.
Standard Method Performance Requirements for DNA-Based Methods of Detecting 
Burkholderia pseudomallei in Field-Deployable, Department of Defense Aerosol Collection 
Devices, AOAC SMPR 2016.009 (10)
Burkholderia pseudomallei is a Tier 1 select agent and an aerobic, Gram-negative bacillus 
that causes the disease melioidosis. It is common in many tropical regions but is particularly 
important in northern Australia and Southeast Asia, where virulent strains can be easily 
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isolated from water and soil. For biothreat concerns, there are two closely related species of 
Burkholderia: pseudomallei and mallei. B. mallei causes a distinct disease (glanders) and is 
actually a clonal derivative from B. pseudomallei. In contrast to B. pseudomallei, B. mallei 
has much lower diversity, and there is no evidence of horizontal gene transfer, although large 
chromosomal deletions have occurred and can affect assay design. DUSA directed the 
working group to focus on B. pseudomallei but to consider how the inclusivity and 
exclusivity panels might be designed to accommodate evaluations of the B. mallei species. 
Because of their close relationship, the B. mallei inclusivity panel serves as a partial 
exclusively panel for B. pseudomallei and conversely for the reverse comparison.
There is great genetic diversity within the B. pseudomallei species because of frequent 
recombination and horizontal transfer of genetic material. In pairwise comparisons, any two 
isolates of B. pseudomallei will be different at >10% of their gene content. Therefore, it is 
important for the inclusivity panel to capture as much of this diversity as possible to avoid 
assays with lower sensitivity. There are two major populations in B. pseudomallei species, 
Australian and Southeast Asian. Therefore, five isolates from each population are included 
in the inclusivity panel.
The exclusivity panel is composed of 19 Burkholderia spp. that have potential to cause 
diagnostic confusion (lower specificity) based on their close relation to B. pseudomallei. The 
B. pseudomallei exclusivity panel was designed so that it could also be used as an 
exclusivity list to evaluate methods designed to detect B. mallei species. Species identified 
as 3 to 19 in the SMPR could be used to evaluate the specificity of methods design to detect 
B. mallei species only.
Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for Detection of Botulinum 
Neurotoxins Al andA2 in Field-Deployable, Department of Defense (DoD) Aerosol 
Collection Devices, AOAC SMPR 2016.011 (11)
Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxic protein produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum 
and related species. It is also produced commercially for medical, cosmetic, and research 
use. There are two main commercial types: botulinum toxin type A and botulinum toxin type 
B. Infection with the bacterium may result in a potentially fatal disease called wound 
botulism. However, most cases of botulism result from ingestion of the botulinum 
neurotoxin. The DoD’s concern is the detection of aerosolized botulinum toxins.
The working group determined that the AMDL can be done using just Al complex, 
but the AMDL would need to be higher, and 1.25 ng/mL was agreed. A2 to A8 
were then removed from the inclusivity table.
Candidate methods must be able to detect botulinum neurotoxins Al and A2 in liquid 
samples.
Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for Detection of Coxiella burnetii, 
AOAC SMPR 2015.011 (12)
Coxiella burnetii is a small Gram-negative bacterium, an obligate intracellular bacterial 
pathogen, and the causative agent of Q fever. The genus Coxiella is morphologically similar 
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to Rickettsia but with a variety of genetic and physiological differences. C. burnetii is highly 
resistant to environmental stresses, such as high temperature, osmotic pressure, and 
ultraviolet light. It can survive standard disinfectants and is resistant to many other 
environmental changes.
C. burnetii is a highly infectious agent and wide-spread among livestock around the world. 
Although the culture process for C. burnetii is laborious, large amounts of infectious 
material can be produced. If used as an aerosolized biological weapon, C. burnetii may not 
cause high mortality but could provoke acute disabling disease. In its late course, Q fever 
can be complicated by fatal (e.g., endocarditis) or debilitating (e.g., chronic fatigue 
syndrome) disorders. The diagnosis of Q fever might be delayed because of nonspecific 
presentations. Effective antibiotic treatment is available for the acute form of the disease but 
not for the chronic complications.
The Q Fever Working Group agreed on a scope for the SMPR as field-deployable assays 
(preferred) that are specific for the detection of C. burnetii in collection buffers from aerosol 
collection devices. The working group also set the AMDL at 2000 genomic equivalents/mL 
of C. burnetii target DNA in the candidate method sample collection buffer. This 
concentration is based on AMDL levels established during the development of AOAC 
SMPRs for other threat agents. The theoretical minimum detection level for state-of-the-art 
technology is 1 genome equivalent. For validation purposes, homogeneity at very low 
concentrations, such as 1 genome equivalent per microliter, is problematic because of 
sampling error. Therefore, a minimum of 20 genome equivalents per microliter considers the 
sample error because of random distribution of the target. Most collection buffers are kept in 
the milliliter range, from which microliter range test samples are taken, so a 100-times scale 
up is needed. Therefore, the AMDL is set at 2000 genome equivalents per milliliter.
The working group developed an inclusivity panel consisting of the C. burnetii phylogenic 
groups 1 to 6 and provided isolate examples for testing purposes. The exclusivity panel 
consists of four Legionellae species and/or strains and one Rickettsiella spp. These species 
or strains represent the only known closely related species.
Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for Detection of Francisella 
tularensis in Aerosol Collection Devices, AOAC SMPR 2016.007(13)
F. tularensis is a Gram-negative bacterial pathogen and the causative agent of tularemia of 
rabbit fever. F. tularensis is classified as a Category A bioterrorism agent by the CDC 
because it can be easily spread by aerosol and is highly virulent. The Francisella genus is 
traditionally divided into three species, F. tularensis, F philomiragia, and F novicida. Of 
these species, F. tularensis is the only species that is clinically significant. F. tularensis has 
three subspecies, including F. tularensis subspecies tularensis, F. tularensis subspecies 
holartica, and F. tularensis subspecies mediasiatica. Of these subspecies, F. tularensis 
subspecies tularensis is highly virulent, whereas F. tularensis subspecies holartica is less 
virulent. Each of the three subspecies was originally represented on the inclusivity panel in a 
previous SMPR (unpublished), but F. tularensis subspecies mediasiatica was removed 
because of a lack of available strains in the United States. Strains of the remaining two 
subspecies (F. tularensis subspecies tularensis and F. tularensis subspecies holartica) were 
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chosen to cover the genotypes (types Al, A2, and B) and to provide some geographical 
diversity of isolates. There are nine F tularensis strains on the inclusivity panel, including 
genotypes Al, A2, and B. The exclusivity panel contains 10 near neighbors, including six 
strains of F. philomiragia, three strains of F novicida, and one strain of Wolbachia persica, 
which is a species closely related to F tularensis.
A major issue for development of an SMPR for tularensis was the proposed reclassification 
of F. novicida. In 2005, Sjöstedt proposed that F. novicida be reclassified as F. tularensis 
subspecies novicida, but this reclassification has not been officially recognized (14). For this 
reason, F. novicida was included in the exclusivity panel becasue the target for this SMPR is 
specifically F. tularensis.
Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for Detection of Staphylococcal 
Enterotoxin B, AOAC SMPR 2015.013 (15)
SEB is an enterotoxin produced by the Gram-positive bacteria Staphylococcus aureus. It is a 
common cause of food poisoning, with severe diarrhea, nausea, and intestinal cramping 
often starting within a few hours of ingestion. The toxin is quite stable and may remain 
active even after the contaminating bacteria are killed. The toxin can withstand boiling at 
100°C for a few minutes. Gastroenteritis occurs because SEB is a superantigen, causing the 
immune system to release a large amount of cytokines that lead to significant inflammation.
As a possible biological weapons agent, SEB is stable when transformed into an aerosol and 
can produce multiorgan and system-wide symptoms. In extremely high doses, SEB may 
induce shock and even death. Symptoms of an aerosolized attack differ from ingestion and 
include high fever, chills, headache, muscle ache, dry cough, and inflammation of the eye 
lids. Aerosolized SEB may also cause trouble with breathing, chest pains, and the 
development of fluid in the lungs. Typically, SEB is considered an incapacitating agent that 
causes debilitation for up to 2 weeks. Small amounts can debilitate large numbers of victims 
because only 1/4000 of a microgram is fatal to 50% of the exposed population, and 1/200 of 
a microgram can induce fatality in 50%) of the human population. The agent cannot be 
transmitted from person to person.
SEB is one of 24 known enterotoxins produced by S. aureus. The other enterotoxins are 
designated as SEA, SEC, SED, SEE, and SEH-SEV. The working group originally 
suggested that the DoD consider including SEA and SEC in the scope of the SMPR as the 
operational response would be the same. After much discussion, the stakeholder panel 
decided to focus this SMPR on SEB only; however, there might be the possibility of 
developing an SMPR for SEA, SEB, and SEC 1, SEC 2, and SEC3 at a later time. 
Therefore, the exclusivity panel for this SMPR includes SEA, SEC, SED, SEE, SEH, SEI, 
SEJ, and SEK (if available). The working group set the AMDL at 0.25 ng/mL of recovered 
SEB toxin in liquid and set the POD at the AMDL at ≥0.95.
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Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for DNA-Based Methods of 
Detecting Yersinia pestis in Field-Deployable, Department of Defense Aerosol Collection 
Devices, AOAC SMPR 2016.008 (16)
Y. pestis is a Gram-negative, rod-shaped bacterium belonging to the Enterobacteriaceae 
family. Human infection by Y. pestis takes three main forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and 
septicemic. All three forms are widely believed to have been responsible for several high-
mortality epidemics throughout human history. Because of its high mortality and aerosol 
communicability, the CDC has classified Y. pestis as a Category A bioterrorism agent.
The challenges in developing inclusivity and exclusivity panels for Y. pestis include the 
genomic similarity of Y. pestis to Y. pseudotuberculosis, the lack of genetic diversity among 
isolates of Y. pestis, and the availability of strains.
The inclusivity panel for SMPR 2016.008 contains 16 Y. pestis strains chosen to cover: the 
Achtmann genotypes, known biovars, and strains lacking the various plasmids. Because the 
genetic variability of Y. pestis is not fully understood, SPADA added two additional strains, 
recent United States isolates, to the proposed inclusivity panel. The exclusivity panel 
contains 17 Yersinia non-pestis isolates that represent eight Yersinia species.
The AMDL was initially set at 500 cells per aerosol filter because the infective dose is low 
for these organisms. However, because of the many variables in aerosol collection, such as 
the flow rate through the collector, length of time of collection, whether indoor or outdoor, 
and potential volume of air affected by the release, it is difficult to equate an infective dose 
to any specific number of cells collected on an air filter. The Y. pestis working groups 
decided to recommend the same AMDL as was determined for B. anthracis (20,000 cells per 
aerosol filter; 2000 cells/mL aerosol collection liquid) based on what PCR methods could 
reasonably be expected to detect.
Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs) for Detection and Identification of 
Variola Virus DNA, AOAC SMPR 2016.012 (17)
Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, is a solely human pathogen classified as a 
Category A agent. Smallpox was a feared disease that caused death in up to 40% of those 
infected. In 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared smallpox to be 
eradicated, the only human disease to date, and the known remaining virus stocks are now 
held in two WHO collaborating centers. The WHO has published several restrictions on who 
can obtain Variola virus DNA and what manipulations can be conducted (http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/205564/1/WHO_OHE_PED_2016.1_eng.pdf).
Unique challenges exist for development of detection assays for the presence of Variola 
virus. Because smallpox is eradicated and Variola virus is no longer found in nature, the 
predictive value positive (the proportion of true positives among those testing positive) is 
incredibly low. Therefore, the probability of a false-positive result is quite high, which could 
have significant negative impact on societal infrastructure when related to a Category A 
agent. One method to increase the predictive value positive of an assay is to incorporate 
detection assays for more than one target. There is greater confidence in a positive result 
when multiple regions of the genome are detected. However, the only way to confirm 
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whether viable virus at present is by propagation within tissue culture, which should only be 
attempted within one of the two WHO Collaborating Centers for Smallpox.
Another challenge exists when attempting to design detection assays specific for Variola 
virus DNA. Variola virus is a member of the Orthopoxvirus family, whose members share a 
high degree of nucleotide similarity. Because of this high level of similarity, DNA detection 
assays must be thoroughly interrogated for specificity compared with these “near-neighbor” 
viruses. To further complicate matters, new members of the Orthopoxvirus family have been 
identified in recent years. These sequences must also be evaluated to determine if they have 
compromised the integrity of the detection assay. This requires vigilance in continued 
monitoring of the target of these assays.
An SMPR for Variola virus DNA was developed under SPADA in 2014 for Bio Watch and 
served as the foundation for the current SMPR specific to DoD application. Inclusivity and 
exclusivity panels are based on bioinformatic analysis. For exclusivity, there is a core group 
of poxvirus strains outlined in the SMPR (one from each major clade), which the detection 
assay should be tested against. Based on bioinformatics analysis of the target region(s), other 
virus strains with a higher degree of similarity compared with the strain listed in the core 
group should also be “wet-lab” tested in the detection assay. For inclusivity, at least one 
representative from each major clade of Variola virus, as well as any other strains that show 
differences within the target region, should be tested in the detection assay. Because only the 
two WHO Collaborating Centers for Smallpox can possess the whole genomic DNA of 
Variola virus, plasmid DNA containing <500 bp may be used to verify the sensitivity of the 
detection assay.
The Variola SMPR is notable as the first SMPR to incorporate the use of bioinformatics 
analysis, also known as in silico analysis. The SMPR includes sources, instructions on the 
use, and the application of bioinformatics analysis.
Standard Method Performance Requirements for Identification of Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis Virus (VEEV), SMPR 2015.012 (18)
Note: For the purposes of this manuscript, VEE, EEE, and WEE refer to the diseases 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis, and Western equine 
encephalitis. VEEV, WEEV, and EEEV refer to the causative agents of the diseases: 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Eastern equine encephalitis virus, and Western equine 
encephalitis virus.
VEEV is an alphavirus and is the causative agent of Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE). 
Other related diseases caused by alphaviruses include Eastern equine encephalitis (EEE), 
Western equine encephalitis (WEE), Chikungunya fever, Semliki Forest disease, Barmah 
Forest fever, and Ross River fever. VEEV is a mosquito-borne viral pathogen. VEEV can 
affect all equine species, such as horses, donkeys, and zebras. After infection, equines may 
suddenly die or show progressive central nervous system disorders. Humans also can 
contract this disease.
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VEE infection generally occurs when a person is bitten by an infected mosquito. VEE is 
highly infectious when aerosolized. Healthy adults who become infected by the virus may 
experience flu-like symptoms that may progress to neurologic disease. The disease is usually 
acute, prostrating, and of short duration. Illness begins suddenly with generalized malaise, 
spiking fevers, rigors, severe headache, photophobia, and myalgia. Nausea, vomiting, cough, 
sore throat, and diarrhea may follow. Full recovery takes 1 to 2 weeks. People with 
weakened immune systems and the young and the elderly can become severely ill or die 
from this disease.
VEE neurologic disease in humans is characterized by inflammation of the meninges of the 
brain and of the brain itself, thus accounting for the predominance of central nervous system 
symptoms. The overall mortality rate for VEE is less than 1% but is somewhat higher among 
children and older adults.
VEEV can be easily produced in large amounts and aerosolized for biological weapons 
purposes. As a biological agent, VEEV is relatively stable and can potentially injure 
thousands. Additionally, VEEV can be genetically manipulated, which may enhance its 
infectiousness and virulence for biological weapons purposes.
As part of this project, the DoD asked the VEE Working Group to consider whether EEEV 
and WEEV should be included as part of the scope of the SMPR. EEEV and WEEV are in 
the same antigenic complex as VEEV, and they are distantly related to VEEV. However, they 
are not genetically close to VEEV, so designing a molecular assay that would detect VEEV, 
WEEV, and EEEV might not be possible. Therefore, this SMPR was developed specifically 
for the identification of VEEV.
The working group established the AMDL at 5000 genome copies/mL for VEEV in aerosol 
collection liquid. This level is higher than the other bacterial biological threat agents because 
VEEV is an RNA virus that requires additional manipulations for PCR detection assays. The 
working group identified four serotype variants and representative strains for the inclusivity 
panel and identified nine viruses, including EEEV and WEEV, for the exclusivity panel.
Environmental Factors Study
Appendix O: Environmental Factors for Validating Biological Threat Agent Detection 
Assays (19)
The Environmental Factors study is common to all biological threat agent SMPRs, and it is 
designed to consider the types of evaluation needed to demonstrate that assays for the 
detection of biological threat agents are sufficiently rugged to maintain reliability when 
deployed in the field. Field applications include subway, bus, and airport sites, public and/or 
private buildings, and public spaces such as sports and entertainment facilities. PCR assays 
are typically developed for laboratory use in controlled environments. The deployment of 
PCR assays into an uncontrolled field increases the possibility of potential inhibition of the 
PCR amplification process and potential cross-reactivity with DNA fragments that are 
naturally occurring in the outside environment.
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The Environmental Factors study is organized into three parts: environmental matrix study, 
environment organisms, and potential interferences. The environmental matrix study consists 
of evaluating stored, previously used environmental filters that previously produced negative 
results. In this study, half of the filters are used to evaluate for inhibition. There is concern 
that some naturally occurring potential inhibits can be anticipated and evaluated directly, but 
there might be naturally occurring potential inhibits that are not anticipated. Testing 
previously used environmental filters from a variety of regions and locales may expose an 
unanticipated inhibition and provide a baseline for estimating inhibition in field deployed 
PCR assays.
Part 2 of the Environmental Factors study, known as the Environmental Organisms section, 
is an evaluation of potential cross-reactivity with the DNA from a wide variety of organisms 
in the environment. There is concern that some naturally occurring potential cross-reactive 
strains can be anticipated and evaluated directly in the near-neighbor exclusivity panel, but 
there might be naturally occurring cross-reacting DNA fragments that are not anticipated. 
Environmental organisms were selected based on the expected prevalence of certain 
organisms in the environment, representation of the major genera expected in the 
environment, and availability of DNA from specific species representing the major genera. 
This section is noteworthy as the newly revised 2017 study now incorporates an option to 
use bioinformatics analysis, which greatly reduces the need for “wet” testing.
Part 3 of the Environmental Factors study, known as the Potential Interferents, was added to 
the Environmental Factors study in 2015. Part 3 considers the potential interferents that may 
be encountered in the DoD applications. The DoD applications include areas where active 
combat may be occurring and in other parts of the world. The DoD specific application 
required a reconsideration of the Environmental Factors section of the SMPR. The biggest 
concern was that combat situations are potential interferents, such as jet fuel, exhaust, 
obscurants (fog agents), burning vegetation, rubber, etc. Therefore, a new section on 
“Potential Interferents” was added to the Environmental Factors panel for the DoD-specific 
SMPRs.
Summary
SPADA has produced a set of performance standards for the top 10 priority biological threat 
agents to help method developers design assays and that method users can utilize to evaluate 
potential assays. These SMPRs describe the minimum performance requirements as 
determined by the most respected experts in the world. Four of these SMPRs (Francisella 
tularensis, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Variola Major, and Brucella suis) allow for the use of 
in silico analysis in lieu of direct testing under some circumstances in which inclusivity 
and/or exclusivity species or stains are not available. In another significant first, in silico 
analysis is offered as an option to reduce the required number of environmental organism 
DNA or RNA “wet” tests in the Environmental Study. It is expected that in silico analysis 
will reduce the amount of testing time and cost required and provide researchers with a 
much greater ability to determine potential cross-reactive DNA from environmental species.
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Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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